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Alliances have played a central role in the pursuit of inter-communal security throughout
history and have been a salient feature of contemporary international relations. The
growing complexity of a dynamic strategic environment contests the utility of traditional
military alliances. Such alliances, argue some, have proven to be of limited value in an era
of complex challenges stemming from the proliferation of WMD, transnational terrorism,
failed states, counterinsurgencies, environmental degradation and other asymmetrical
threats. Nevertheless, interest in alliance-based security arrangements is not waning.
While it is unlikely they will simply go away, alliances will undoubtedly need to adapt to
the changing security environment and growing diversity of security cooperation. NATO,
perhaps the most successful modern-day political-military alliance, has gone through a
fundamental post-Cold War transformation and is about to implement a new strategic
concept that could well entrench a new standard for future alliances. These onerous
changes are shaped by factors within and outside NATO.
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1. Introduction
Alliances have been deemed "a universal
component of relations between political units,
irrespective of time or place.'" Associated with
both war and peace, alliances have played a
central role in the pursuit of inter-communal
security and, whether in ancient or modem times,
have helped shape key historical developments.
From Antiquity to the Middle Ages to the Peace
of Westphalia and from the Napoleonic wars to
*Dragan Lozancic is a civil servant in the Republic of Croatia
Ministry of Defense and a former professor of security studies
at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The expressed views and
opinions in this article are exclusively those ofthe author.
the Cold War, alliances represented important
means in the pursuit of interests, security and
power. The increasingly complex nature of
today's strategic environment and the diversity of
security arrangements devised by states challenge
the very notion of alliance, as many scholars
wonder if it remains a useful concept at all.' But
despite current attempts to dismiss contemporary
alliances as gradually loosing significance, states
continue to seek security through alignment with
other states.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has significantly expanded its scope and
membership, despite the break-up of the former
Soviet Union and the dissolution of its Warsaw
75
76 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
Pact, the main reason NATO was established
in the first place. Uncertainty, fear and a lack
of trust, among other reasons, led many East
European countries to seek shelter under NATO's
security umbrella. On the other hand, older allies
continue to perceive added value in maintaining
the alliance. But since the end of the Cold War,
scholars have been repeatedly predicting the end
of NATO, arguing that with the disappearance
of a clear adversary threat there was no longer
a rational reason to maintain the alliance.
Yet, NATO persisted against its critics and is
developing a new strategic concept designed to
reaffirm its traditional "collective defense" role
and forge a new sense of purpose amid an ever
changing strategic environment. Nevertheless,
internal and external factors are increasingly
testing the alliance's cohesiveness, structural
bonds and viability.
2. Defining an Alliance
Generally speaking, an alliance is a relationship
formed between distinct actors seeking to
further common interests or a j oint purpose.
While this notion is easily applicable to political
parties, professional associations and private
enterprises, as well as inter-governmental and
non-governmental organizations, it is the state
actor that is of particular concern here. Likewise,
whereas the subject matter of alliances in general
can equally be suited for a variety of political,
economic and social purposes, the purview of
this paper concerns those inter-state associations
determined by military or security factors. Such
relationships have been traditionally called
military alliances and have long represented a
fundamental component of international relations
dynamics. Political and historical accounts of the
importance that alliances played in shaping events
and developments throughout the ages abound.
It is difficult to describe international relations
without referring to alliances as the two are often
intricately linked in all but name.'
Defining alliance, however, is not an easy
task. Never did relations between political units
produce a more elastic notion as that of alliance.
Efforts to develop a widely accepted, universal
definition of alliance have been elusive, despite
a rich body of academic literature, theoretical
research and practical case studies. Critics point to
the ambiguity and amorphousness of most treaties
of alliance." While many writers shy away from
defining the term altogether and simply submerge
themselves in conceptual and practical attributes,
those more courageous often opt for definitions
that are either narrowly linked to a particular
prototype alliance set or are simply too broad
and vague to be of any serious analytical value.
Confronted with such a protean phenomenon,
it is no wonder that "many a would-be alliance
theorists" are more ready to retreat to a topic
more manageable, such as another assessment of
NATO.5
Definitions of alliance span a wide spectrum
and can easily conjure different interpretations
even among the most renowned scholars of
international relations. Consider the following
definitions readily found in the literature:
a formal association between states against the
threat of another more powerful state;"
"a limited set of states acting in concert at X
time regarding the mutual enhancement of the
military security of the members;"?
"a formal or informal arrangement for security
cooperation between two or more sovereign
states;"!
a formal association "of states for the use
(or non use) of military force, in specific
circumstances, against states outside their
own membership;"?
"a formal contingent commitment by two or
more states to some future action.'?"
One analyst found 35 distinct definitions
in a self-proclaimed thorough review of the
international relations literature. I I Part of the
difficulty lies in attributing alliance status to a wide
variety of different state-to-state relationships.
On the one hand, an alliance between states
has implied a relationship based on a security
guarantee or a mutual assistance pledge in case of
aggression. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty
is a good example. An armed attack against one
or more member states is considered an attack
against all and results in an obligation of aid
towards the member or members attacked. On
the other hand, a broader interpretation includes
all sorts of security arrangements and strategic
partnerships of a meaningful nature short of
a security guarantee. For example, Wikipedia
lists the Shanghai Co-operation Organization
(SCO) as a military alliance "formed in 1996 to
counterbalance NATO expansion.':" One scholar
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concludes that the European Union (EU) meets
the criteria of being an alliance, but suggests it
falls short of being deemed a military alliance, at
least for now."
Alliances come III a variety of shapes and
forms. They can be bilateral or multilateral.
While bilateral alliances can also be informal,
most contemporary multilateral alliances are
formal relationships usually codified by way of
an international agreement or protocol. There
have been many efforts to catalogue or categorize
alliances based on a host of variables. In 1966,
Singer and Small developed the first systematic
and quantitative description of international
alliances between the Napoleonic wars and World
War II. 14A few years later, Russett examined and
classified all military alliances concluded during
the period 1920-1957.15 More recently, Gibler
compiled and briefly described over 450 alliances
since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.16 But
such efforts are usually criticized for conceptual
inconsistencies, self-imposed limits on data sets
or a variety of other reasons. Sadly, a review of
the available literature on alliances raises serious
doubts about the prospects of reaching consensus
on a common definition.
3. Traditional Nature of Alliances
The lack of a universal, widely accepted definition
of alliance is reflected in similarly competing
views that attempt to explain why alliances are
formed, how they are managed and when they are
terminated. Most explanations usually fall into
two basic schools of thought. First, alliances are
seen as a key element in a "balance of power"
system where states coexist in a world of self-help.
Unchecked power, irrespective of who wields it,
is perceived as a potential danger and thus states
perpetually seek to balance against each other
through shifting alignments. Such arguments
are consistent with the notion of Realism in
international relations. Alternatively, alliances are
believed to be by-products of shared values and
other common characteristics that bring states
together. This view stems from liberal perceptions
or the Idealism theory of world politics.
Traditional realists argue that international
politics is a competitive realm, whereby states
struggle for power, mainly seek security and try to
maximize their national interests. Such scholars
rely heavily on balance of power concepts to
explain alliances. Thus, Hans Morgenthau refers
to alliances as "a necessary function of the balance
of power operating in a multiple state system.?"
According to George Liska, whose 1962 Nations
in Alliance remains one of the defining works on
the subject matter, alliances are always against,
and only derivatively for, someone or something. 18
And while the "sense of community" may
altruistically consolidate alliances, he argues,
it seldom brings them about." The diplomacy
by which alliances are made, maintained and
disrupted, writes Kenneth Waltz, represents the
very substance of balance of power politics."
In the 1980s, Stephen Walt suggested a slight
modification of the popular realist theory by
arguing that states balance not so much against
power but against threat." In the neorealist
tradition, Walt maintained that while power was
no doubt a significant factor, it was the "level of
threat" characterized by geographic proximity,
offensive capability and perceived intentions that
eventually accounted for states' behavior when
it came to decisions to ally. If the danger was
great enough, a state would partner with almost
any other state. Alliances are made by states that
share a basic common interest, namely, the fear of
other states. To avoid the hell of military defeat,
states will ally with the devil." While states
are sometimes also prone to "bandwagoning,"
whether to appease a threatening power or
simply because they are attracted to power, Walt
maintains that "balancing" against a threat is "far
more common. "23
Put yet another way, alliances are forged on the
basis of a cost-benefit analysis. Whether a great
or small power, a state will weigh the advantages
and disadvantages of alliance membership.
On the one hand, by dividing responsibilities
and sharing assets, states believe they can
acquire greater security and save costs. When
the relationship is between a great power and a
small one, their bonding can still make sense,
despite their asymmetric military capabilities, if
their respective cost-benefit calculus is somehow
mutually self-serving. For example, this is true
in the hypothetical case in which a small power
is seeking greater security and the large power is
simply seeking influence, access to military bases
or other political concessions. If both perceive
a net gain in their respective calculations,
alignment is likely to come about. On the other
hand, membership in an alliance has its costs
and is certainly not without risks. Membership
can affect sovereignty, create new obligations
and restrict policy flexibility. A member state's
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fear of "entrapment" can be realized when an
ally reluctantly drags it into a conflict it had no
interest in or previous wish to be part of. And
despite pledges of aid, states also worry about
"abandonment," the risk of overdependence on
an ally's assistance which never materializes in a
CrISIS.
Idealists would by contrast argue that states
choose to establish and maintain alliances
because of shared values and ideals. States with
similar internal characteristics are more likely to
ally than states with divergent domestic political
systems. Meaningful alliances result when states
share ideological, political, cultural or other key
traits. "The natural tendency of mankind, as any
schoolboy knows," writes Michael Howard, "is
not to stand alone, or even to wish to do so: it
is to join together for protection in like-minded
groups - families, clans, tribes, not least juvenile
gangs.'?" Despite a sharp contrast to traditional
realist explanations, idealists believe that shared
values and like-minded governments are no less
important factors and significantly contribute
to the establishment of an alliance. Without
the shared values upon which democracy is
built, NATO would not have been created; that
is what separated it from the Warsaw Pact." In
today's world, it is a state's form of government,
argues Robert Kagan, and not its civilization or
geographical location that will greatly determine
its geopolitical alignment."
The truth is perhaps somewhere in between the
entrenched confines of the two theories. States
will enter into alliances for a variety of reasons, of
which the pursuit of military security is but one."
Institutionalists would highlight the importance
of institutions. They say that institution-based
alliances like NATO may be difficult to create and
set in motion, at the beginning, but once created,
they can take on a life of their own. Alliances can
also differ according to purpose. Likewise, the
nature and purposes of alliances change as the
structure of the international system varies. This
is perhaps self-evident in the obvious differences
between pre-World War I, multi-polar alliances
in Europe and the global, bi-polar alignments of
the Cold War. In the former case, most alliances
consisted of a small number of member states
of comparable capabilities. In the later case, the
two major alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
were respectively dominated by a single dominant
power and were more like treaties of guarantee
with the US and Soviet Union providing most of
the security."
Douglas Gibler frames it in this perspective:
"not all alliances are alike. Alliances are rarely
formed only to balance power or avoid threats.
Instead, alliances are created for a multitude
of reasons, and their purpose can change
dramatically over time. That is why theories of
alliances that focus on the capabilities of states,
or even on changes in these capabilities, often
perform so poorly in explaining simple alliance
behavior. There is a tendency to overemphasize
the strategic nature of power and statecraft at the
expense of understanding alliances as useful tools
of cooperation.'?" Essentially, both theoretical
explanations provide useful insight and need to
be carefully balanced when applied. Following
this prescription on the multifaceted nature and
variability of alliances should enable us to forward
our thinking about how alliances will evolve in
years to come.
4. Contemporary Security Challenges
Changes in the international system and structure
have had a determinant-like impact on state
behavior and their alliances. The adoption of the
UN Charter in 1945 and the growing emergence of
widely-accepted international norms established
new principles and imposed limits that would have
a profound affect on alliances. The UN Charter's
reference to an inherent right of collective self-
defense (Chapter VII, Article 51) and recognition
of the existence of "regional arrangements or
agencies" for dealing with international security
(Chapter VIII, Article 52) codified the legitimacy
of alliances, albeit somewhat constrained
from traditional notions. It also reiterated the
sovereignty of states, brought about commitments
to resolving disputes peacefully and introduced
far-reaching restrictions on states' resort to use
force. While old-styled alliances ofthe nineteenth
century and those leading up to the First World
War usually identified opponents, contemporary
alliances, especially after 1945, seldom do.
The 1975 Helsinki Final Act and a series of
other international declarations and agreements
confirmed that a state had an inherent right "to be
free to choose or change its security arrangements,
including treaties of alliance, as they evolve.'?"
These normative changes were also intertwined
with strategic developments. The end of the Cold
War brought about the end of bipolarity of world
politics based on tIle- United States-Soviet Union
rivalry. But as the Soviet Union's Warsaw Treaty
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Organization (WTO) was dissolved, its arch-
rival NATO was struggling to re-conceive itself.
Cooperation between former adversaries suddenly
became trendy and led to a resurgence of security
cooperation through arms control, strategic
partnerships, regional initiatives and a host of
other security arrangements. NATO extended
offers of partnership to its Eastern neighbors and
opened its doors to new members. Even non-
aligned and staunchly neutral countries, such as
Switzerland, opted to take advantage of this new
era of security cooperation. Today, it seems that
states are ready to shed orthodox approaches in
pursuing security and more willing to explore
other options in choosing a security arrangement
that suits them best.
Traditional alliances first and foremost served
as principle means and instruments in the pursuit
of national security. Threats to states mainly came
from other states that were militarily capable of
causing serious harm. Thus, two fundamental
attributes characterized a typical alliance-a
threat from another state (or group of states)
and military security. While contemporary states
cannot completely rule out the possibility of being
the victim of aggression from other states, more
likely, they will have to deal with a host of non-
traditional security concerns and face transnational
challenges to their security. A typical lineup of
such worries includes international terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
weak and failed states, consequences of climate
change and environmental degradation, organized
crime, illegal trafficking, migration and other
demographic pressures, pandemics and infectious
diseases, resource competition and energy
security. Thus, if alliances are to remain useful
instruments of statecraft, states' expectations from
alliances may need to be adjusted accordingly.
This would imply alliances retain part of their
traditional competence of dealing with the vestige
of potential threats coming from other states
and adapt to the new strategic environment by
also developing the capacity to deal with these
nontraditional security challenges.
But many uncertainties remain. Can
contemporary alliances adapt and make this
transition? Are they able to maintain traditional
military assurance and yet deal with these new
security challenges? What can alliances do about
climate change? Can they combat international
terrorism? How can they contribute to energy
security and cyber defense? While these and
similar questions beg for answers, they are difficult
issues to address directly. As a phenomenon of
international relations, alliances appear to be
in the middle of the current changing security
environment and the structural changes taking
place in world politics. But it is proving difficult
to get a sense of any permanent changes on how
we perceive alliances. Historically, alliances have
shown a remarkable ability to adapt to varying
circumstances and it will be interesting to see how
alliances as concepts emerge from the current
changes taking place. The purposes and goals of
existing alliances have changed with time. New
alliances have adopted conceptual and structural
postures that conform to the new, nontraditional
security concerns, yet also maintain certain
traditional characteristics.
5. Changing Nature of Alliances
Alliances have changed greatly over time. But
whether the fundamental nature of alliances
has changed much remains a matter of debate.
Realists would say that as long as states continue
to perceive the existence of external threats to
their national security, alliances, in the traditional
sense, will continue to matter." Once established,
an alliance is expected to endure until the purposes
of the allies are met." Intuitively, if the threat is
removed, an alliance becomes obsolete. Idealists
would contend that as long as states shared
common values and similar characteristics,
they will be inclined to ally. The removal of a
specific threat does not in itself imply the end of
the need to ally as states see enduring benefits in
safeguarding their common values. Regardless
of which side of the argument one takes, the
ability to adapt to changing circumstances has
enabled alliances to become ubiquitous in the
international system and evolve into useful tools
for cooperation and conflict management that
serve far-ranging purposes." This can be equally
said of alliances that have managed to survive the
end of the Cold War, as well as those most recently
established such as the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO).
The evolution, modification and eventual
merger of the 1948 Brussels Treaty into the EU
is a particularly instructive and unique case.
Initially established by five Western European
states against the possible resurgence of German
nationalism and to -ceunter the growing power
of the Soviet Union, the original treaty was
renegotiated in 1954 and eventually expanded
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to a total of ten members, to include Germany,
becoming the Western European Union (WEU).
These states, also members of both the EU and
NATO, acknowledged the existence of common
values and interests, pledged assistance to each
other in the wake of aggression and committed to
promoting unity and encouraging the progressive
integration of Europe. But for most of its existence,
the WEU appeared redundant, given US security
guarantees in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,
and was opaquely overshadowed by NATO's
integrated military structures and tangible
capabilities. Slowly but surely, the Europeans
began to develop their own security and defense
cooperation within the EU. Under its European
Security and Defense Policy, the EU has
developed closer military cooperation among its
member states and the capacity to deploy forces
and assume complex stability operations.
The EU took another important step in its
evolution by carefully incorporating defense
and other security-related commitments into its
new Lisbon Treaty. This was not an easy task
as the language of the mutual assistance clause,
Article 28A.7[42.7] of the Lisbon Treaty, had to
be surgically formulated to satisfy three groups
of states: those seeking security assurance; those
that wanted to maintain their neutral status; and
those concerned about consistency with their
NATO commitments." So while the WEU ceased
to exist, the nascent treaty was effectively able to
match and carry forward the security guarantees
of the original Brussels Treaty. The new treaty
also introduced a "solidarity clause," whereby
all member states pledged to act jointly and
assist one another if a member state was a victim
of a terrorist attack or in the event of a natural
disaster. The EU's emergence as a security actor
is perhaps one of the most original developments
in the contemporary history of alliances and
international institutions.
The Organization of American States (OAS)
is another post-World War II alliance that had to
reinvent itself in order to fit into the post-Cold War
era and adjust to shifting relationships within its
ranks. The initial purpose of the alliance, based on
the 1947 Rio Treaty, was to organize the states of
the Western hemisphere in a system of collective
security. The ~AS's 1948 Charter also had strong
collective defense provisions. Article 28 of the
Charter maintained that an aggression against a
member state shall be considered an aggression
against all the other states. Its founding member
states were initially concerned with the spread of
communism. After the demise of communism,
many observers felt the OAS would disband.
Instead, the alliance repurposed itself and proved
to be a useful format for resolving a host of
regional issues.
Current efforts of the OAS include
strengthening democracy, peace support and
conflict management, as well as promoting
human rights, development and free trade. In line
with the organization's new multidimensional
concept of security, the OAS's 2003 "Declaration
on Security in the Americas," hardly makes
reference to mutual assistance in case of
aggression, instead focusing on the various
aspects of security cooperation among member
states. Nevertheless, the alliance has had its share
of internecine conflicts, including the rift between
member states, namely Venezuela and the US,
tensions between Columbia and Venezuela,
and disagreement over allowing Cuba to return
to the OAS. Also, there are inchoate efforts by
South American countries to create new regional
structures that would counterbalance US influence
and create more equitable relations, although it is
still uncertain if such efforts will lead to an end of
OAS or to the emergence of a new alliance."
The CSTO was established to formally
institutionalize the 1992 Commonwealth of
Independent States Collective Security Treaty, a
framework for cooperation in parts of the post-
Soviet space. Russia's overwhelming dominance
of the CSTO has not always been wholeheartedly
welcomed by the other members. Azerbaijan and
Georgia left the initial grouping, while Uzbekistan
defected and then returned again. Dmitri Trenin
calls the CSTO "a very loose alliance providing
political consultations, a degree of cooperation,
and very limited interoperability among" its
member states." While the purpose of the CSTO
is to "ensure the collective defense" of member
states, its Charter also refers to an enduring
"objective of maintaining and nurturing a close and
comprehensive alliance.'?" Clearly, this opens the
possibility for a wide range of activities. Fittingly,
Article 9 of the Charter stipulates that member
states "shall agree upon and coordinate their
foreign policy positions regarding international
and regional security problems.'?" However,
when Moscow extended political recognition to
Georgia's break-away regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, it stood alone. None of its CSTO
allies followed suit.
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There are a number of efforts intended to energize
the CSTO. In keeping with global perceptions of
contemporary security concerns, Article 8 of the
CSTO Charter specifically points to transnational
challenges such as international terrorism and
extremism, illicit trafficking, organized crime and
illegal migration. The alliance has embarked on
the development of a rapid reaction force, similar
to NATO's NRF, and is keen on developing the
necessary capabilities to undertake peacekeeping
operations. Furthermore, the CSTO and the UN
signed a declaration on cooperation on March
18, 2010. Russian officials often complain that
NATO refuses to interact with the CSTO because
it fears it would bestow greater recognition on an
organization frequently referred to as a "paper
tiger" by Western officials. While UN officials
see the agreement strengthening cooperation with
regional organizations, CSTO leaders claim it
represents UN recognition of their organization's
authority and legitimacy. Analysts claim Moscow
would like to carve out zones of responsibility
for conducting operations and authorized
interventions under the CSTO flag." After
the 2010 election victory of President Viktor
Yanukovich, Russia has been adamant about
encouraging Ukraine into the CSTO. The 2010
Kyrgyzstan crisis, however, cast serious doubts in
the CSTO's credibility and capacity to deal with a
regional conflict, especially within its own ranks.
6. The Transformation of NATO
The Atlantic Alliance, established over SIX
decades ago in a strategic environment far
removed from today's complex world order,
appears to be enjoying a renaissance in relevance.
Western officials and policymakers have called
NATO "the most successful alliance in history."
On the other hand, Russian officials have
repeatedly expressed their concern about NATO
enlargement and called the alliance a relic of the
Cold War. Russia's 2009 national security strategy
and 2010 military doctrine portray the alliance as
a potential source of danger to Russia's national
security. Scholars, academic analysts and other
observers are divided. Some are quick to praise
NATO's transformation and point to the alliance's
remarkable ability to adjust to internal and
external changes. They argue that the alliance has
become a forum for forging solutions to today's
security problems and that its functions are
becoming even more important for the security
challenges ahead." Others are fairly confident
that the alliance had outlived its purposes and
are sure it will dwindle and ultimately disappear.
"Static and formal defense alliances are outdated,
and will be replaced," they say, "by more fluid,
ad hoc coalitions of like-minded countries.':" The
debate continues despite the development of the
alliance's third strategic concept since the end of
the Cold War.
NATO's transformation has been both a
necessary response and a reflection of the
dramatic changes taking place outside and within
the alliance. While transformation tacitly conjures
thoughts of military and technological innovation,
it is NATO's political and overall transformation
that is behind the alliance's Twenty-First
century renaissance. The main characteristics
of this transformation include NATO's non-
article 5 missions and out-of-area operations,
its global and regional partnerships, relations
with other institutions like the UN and EU, and
its enlargement. It helps explain the alliance's
relevance following the fall ofthe Berlin Wall and
the consequent watershed of changes in world
politics=the end ofthe Cold War, the break-up of
the Soviet Union and the conflict in the Balkans.
If NATO had not transformed, probably it would
not have existed today. Yugoslavia's collapse
forced NATO to undertake a role which it had
never before contemplated, claimed former NATO
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, that of
crisis manager and peacekeeper, adding that the
Alliance's Balkan involvement shaped NATO's
own evolution in critical ways, perhaps more
than any other outside event." The 9/11 terrorist
attacks in the US and NATO's decision to deploy
forces in Afghanistan, as well as Russia's 2008
intervention in Georgia, have also had dramatic
impacts on the alliance.
Internal factors have been no less a staple of
NATO's transformation as those coming from
outside the alliance. The enlargement of NATO
has also altered some of the dynamics within
the alliance, put strains on its long-standing
cohesiveness and challenged its traditional
consensus-based decision-making process. As
debate surrounding the recent strategic concept
revealed, allies often disagreed on key issues
such as threat assessments, relations with Russia
and the future of nuclear weapons in Europe.
Disparity of defense spending and capabilities
development between the US and European allies
continues to cause te~ns. Likewise, repeated
concerns raised by the US officials about the
lack of more equitable commitments in NATO's
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ISAF operation also puts additional strains on
the transatlantic link within the alliance. And
in the wake of the current financial crisis where
European governments are keener on cutting
into defense expenditures, senior ATO officials
worry that excessive cutbacks could prompt the
US to seek out new allies elsewhere. On a positive
note, the 2009 return of France to NATO's
integrated military structure has contributed, at
least symbolically, to rejuvenating moral and self-
confidence among allies to continue on the path
of transformation.
It is nevertheless still unclear if the course of
NATO's current transformation will be adequate
enough for the alliance to prevail. For Realists,
in order to pass the critical test, NATO needed
to find a suitable common enemy to replace the
former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. And
given their state-centric view of global order, they
would likely rule out unconventional threats such
as terrorism, climate change and illegal migration,
as falling outside the purviews of traditional
military alliances which were more suited to
respond to military threats. The hallmarks of a
military alliance are the integration of a military
command, common defense planning, the
unification of ordinance, the sharing of bases
on foreign territory, the organization of joint
exercises and the exchange of intelligence."
Idealists counter that the alliance was always
more about shared values based on democratic
institutions than pure military might. NATO's
new strategic concept is intended to establish
whether the newly transformed alliance still has
value for its member states and how it will best
serve the purposes of their collective efforts.
7. ATO's New Strategic Concept
Alliance strategies are usually the product of
compromise since the interests of allies and their
preferences of how to protect those interests
are seldom identical." NATO allies attached
significant importance to the process of developing
the strategic concept, with the view that it was
no less important than the end product itself.
Not only were all the NATO capitals previously
consulted, but Ally officials also traveled to
Moscow to discuss the new strategy with their
Russian counterparts. At the start, expectations
varied. For years, a heated debate ensued on
whether the alliance should be "globally oriented"
or "stay put" defending the homeland. "NATO
mostly makes sense as an expeditionary force in
an unstable world, wrote Richard Haass, "not as
a standing army on a stable continent."?" Many
allies were arguing that defense of the homeland
begins far from allied territory. And since there
were many other key issues on which allies had
differing opinions, relations with Russia, missile
defense, enlargement and counterterrorism, to
name a few, some analysts predicted that the final
product would be a watered-down document or
a strategic compromise based on a least-common
denominator. But as the process was winding
down in October 20 I0, diplomats acknowledged
differences were narrowing and NATO Secretary
General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, confidently
announced "a real convergence of views on the
essential questions. "46
NATO's new strategic concept could represent
another key milestone in the Alliance's ongoing
transformation. Not only does it set a clear
future path for the organization, but it also tacitly
impacts on shaping perceptions and expectations
of contemporary alliances. ATO was clearly
setting a standard for other alliances to follow.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was not able
to hide his admiration for ATO when he said the
CSTO's newly established rapid reaction force had
to be "just as good as comparable NATO forces.'?"
The new strategic concept is a reflection of the
organization's intent to retain the fundamental
attributes of a traditional military alliance while at
the same time adapt to a new security environment
and changing circumstances within and outside
the alliance. The recommendations of the NATO
Group of Experts, responsible for developing a
report on the new strategic concept, stem from
two basic conclusions: first, NATO serves to
guarantee the safety and security of its member
states; second, this objective can be achieved
only if the alliance actively engages with states
and institutions beyond its borders." Clearly, both
conclusions are indicative of the alliance's core
purpose -- collective defense.
One of the fundamental elements of the
new strategic concept is to signal the alliance's
continued and unwavering security commitment
under Article 5 to all its member states as well as
to any potential aggressor. NATO allies in Central
and Eastern Europe, as well as countries such as
Iceland and Norway, have voiced concerns that the
alliance would not be able to come to their defense
in a real crisis." It is no secret that the Baltic
countries and Poland in particular are somewhat
weary about a resurgent Russia, especially after
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Russia's 2008 military intervention in Georgia.
As a result, the new concept clearly reiterates the
primacy of mutual defense, intuitively calling
for the need to develop contingency plans and
military exercises. As this may be unpalatable to
Moscow, it is unclear how the alliance will be able
to pursue a meaningful partnership with Russia,
nor is it clear how its old adversarial counterpart
will react. The risk of further antagonizing a
resurgent Russian Federation is undeniably on
the minds of Germany, France and Italy and other
allies that want to improve relations. The new
strategy also stipulated the continued necessity to
maintain an adequately balanced mix of military
capabilities, to include both conventional and
nuclear capabilities. As long as there are nuclear
weapons in the world, NATO will likely remain a
nuclear-armed alliance. In addition, allied views
converged on the further need to develop an
alliance-wide antimissile defense system.
The new strategic concept represents a
collective peek at the alliance's strategic
landscape and recognizes that NATO faces "a new
generation of dangers" that call for the alliance
to become "more versatile.'?" The likelihood of
a military attack against an ally, according to
the Group of Experts, is believed to be "slight,"
provided NATO remains vigilant." Instead, it is
more likely that the alliance will face challenges
from non-state actors, such as terrorist groups,
and will have to deal with an assortment of
complex issues and irregular threats. The threat of
cyber attack is a good example. Due to growing
dependencies on information technologies and
the consequent vulnerabilities of civilian and
military infrastructure, computer viruses can
disrupt or deny essential services and functions.
Already, system-targeted computer viruses are
seriously recognized as new weapons of war,
although it is still unclear whether a cyber attack
could justify an Article 5 collective self-defense
response in the alliance. The source of the 2007
denial-of-service virus attack in Estonia has yet to
be determined and would probably be even more
difficult to prove.
NATO's unique assets, stemming from its
integrated military capabilities, enable it to take
on complex stability operations well beyond the
borders of its member states. As many nefarious
groups lurk in the shadows of weak and failed
states, allies are quickly realizing the importance
of maintaining NATO. The challenge will be to
decide when and where to act and when to resort
to other means. But as NATO seeks to become
more versatile, it must be careful not to become
overambitious in trying to defend, deter and
contain everywhere, because we are reminded that
"to defend everywhere is to defend nowhere.t'"
Its previous success has been attributed to the
modesty of its goals and simplicity of purpose."
Such qualifications enabled the alliance to
withstand a great deal of turbulence and maintain
stability through difficult times. NATO's
demanding hybrid-operation in Afghanistan is
already having a profound effect on the alliance
and its future. Afghanistan tops the agenda of
almost any NATO event. Some say the alliance's
credibility may be at stake. While it is premature
to predict the outcome of the conflict and the
success of the operation, one thing is certain, the
allies are showing remarkable solidarity, despite
enormous strains and given that the war effort is
unpopular in many of the home capitals.
The new strategy also outlines a host of
other elements important in defining NATO as
an international organization and an alliance
that brings added value to its member states.
For example, NATO's extensive and diverse
partnerships make it well suited to take on even
the most difficult challenges. Expectations
are that NATO will seldom act alone. Thus,
building a network of relationships with --
other organizations, like the EU, UN and the
OSeE, strategically important regions like the
Mediterranean and Middle East, and key regional
players like Russia and other democracies across
the globe that not only contribute to NATO
operations but also share common values --
makes sense. The strategy calls for exploring
how NATO can improve the way it does
business by emphasizing key reforms, promoting
change in its approach to common funding and
effectively implementing the often referred to
"comprehensive approach" to complex problems.
Such efforts will surely shape NATO for years to
come.
NATO is a political-military alliance of
sovereign states. It is also a successful international
security institution. Its fate will eventually be
determined, not so much by variables of unifying
risks and threats exclusively, as many Realists
would have us believe, or by the mere existence
of common values or like-mindedness, advanced
by Idealists, but by conscious, rational decisions
of the member states themselves. The recent
global economic crisis and the austerity that
many states were faced with may g1ve convinced
some that increasingly constrained defense
84 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
8. Conclusionsresources can be spent more wisely through the
burden-sharing schemes of modem military
alliances. NATO member states are recognizing
the opportunity to rationalize their defense efforts
through multinational collaboration, common
funding and role specialization. And while no one
can deny the growing importance of irregular and
nontraditional security challenges, it is perhaps too
soon to conclude that a permanent paradigmatic
shift in international security is taking place or to
completely rule out the possibility of inter-state
conflict. Clearly, there are many states that do not
share the moral and political values of the Euro-
Atlantic community.
NATO will likely remain relevant as its member
states continue to believe that its existence serves
a useful purpose and brings added value. For
most of the Cold War period, the transatlantic
alliance has been the backbone of the US and
Western European security. At the heart of the
alliance was the belief that transatlantic security
cooperation under the NATO banner was in the
interest of the US and its European allies. Indeed,
much has changed since the ideological East-West
confrontation. But even with its internal strains
and external pressures, NATO has weathered
difficult times and is still in demand. That the
alliance has merit resonates in Washington and all
European NATO capitals. The foreign and security
policies of most European allies regard NATO
as a vital asset in their respective calculations.
According to the 2010 US National Security
Strategy, the US reiterated its commitment
to ensuring NATO remains the world's "pre-
eminent security alliance" by describing alliances
as "force multipliers," stating that "through
multinational cooperation and coordination, the
sum of our actions is always greater than if we
act alone.''" Such language may serve to comfort
those European allies that worry about the US
loosing interest in Europe and seeking new allies
elsewhere.
This article explores the issue of whether an
alliance like NATO is still useful in the post-
Cold War era where nontraditional threats
and challenges have emerged to dominate the
security agenda. The issue of whether these
new threats also require novel arrangements is
largely about whether or not the current alliance-
based institutions are working, and whether new
security arrangements would work better. Looser
coalitions of the willing and more functional
regional security arrangements like the SCO also
provide practical frameworks for cooperation.
As we do not have the comfort of a historical
perspective, we may have to wait years to learn
which arrangement worked best. Due to the lack
of a universal definition, alliances come in many
different shapes and forms, and serve a variety
of purposes. While one set of factors may have
been important in the formation of the alliance,
the same set of factors do not necessarily carry
the same weight throughout the lifetime of the
alliance. An alliance may be established for one
reason, maintained for another and terminated for
an altogether third reason. Thus, it is not unusual
that the purpose and objectives of an alliance are
subject to change with time.
Observations of existing alliances, including
NATO, seem to suggest the general concept of
an alliance is still a useful one. While some Cold
War alliances have dissolved, many have adapted
and are still around. NATO, in particular, has
displayed a remarkable capacity for endurance. Its
transformation has been a massive undertaking of
unparallel historical proportions. NATO has taken
on new tasks and almost doubled its membership
since the end of the Cold War. The adoption of
the Alliance's new strategic concept is testament
to the enduring nature of the transatlantic bond
that holds NATO together. It is also vindication of
NATO's own recognition that its survival depends
on its ability to adapt to changing circumstances
and take on new roles and missions, yet without
shedding its basic DNA -- a mutual commitment
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